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 LETTING GO OF STABILITY: RESILIENCE AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
ROBERT L. FISCHMAN* 
Historic variation in the environment once served as a reliable guide to future 
behavior. Sustainability promised continuity of ecological and social structures and 
functions within the known envelope of historic variation. Now climate change and 
other environmental stressors are tipping systems into behaviors that no longer 
remain within the confines of precedent. Social-ecological systems are neither 
persistent nor predicable. Letting go of stability releases us from untenable 
expectations of steady maintenance of some natural order. Resistance to change will 
continue to play a role as environmental law suppresses disruptions and buys time. 
But resistance will eventually yield the stage to recovery and transformation. 
Recovery seeks to restore some social-ecological services after a disturbance. 
Transformation reorganizes systems entirely. Resilience provides a better framework 
than sustainability for considering the relative merits of these management 
approaches. Managing resilience as an environmental law objective will promise 
less but deliver more of what it promises. Environmental law is for people 
—provisioning their wants and resolving their disputes. Viewing it as a nested set of 
social-ecological systems gets us away from dualist notions of nature versus society 
that seldom help the environmentalist cause. Precaution will remain a defining 
attribute of environmental law, but it cannot promise certainty. Static law will yield 
to experimentation and moral imperatives for change. Resilient environmental law 
will need to be attentive to social, as well as ecological, transformations. It will 
clarify for citizens how they benefit from environmental law. This Article synthesizes 
and assesses the legal scholarship on resilience. It suggests productive paths for law 
reform and more equitable tools for weighing consequences of natural resource 
management. Environmental law research in the coming years should explore 
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INTRODUCTION 
Anglo-American law has always resisted the unpredictability of nature. Law 
facilitates modifications to the environment in order to create more favorable 
conditions for reliable transportation, pollution abatement, and supplies of food and 
energy. People alter the environment and then want the change to stick. The 
environment pushes back and disrupts expectations of stability. 
At one time, a comforting balance-of-nature paradigm promised continued, steady 
ecological services.1 After learning that ecosystems do not conform to that notion, 
sustainability seemed to offer a path to continue legal objectives of stability.2 Today, 
disruptive shifts in society and environmental conditions pose challenges for 
environmental law as guarantor of stability. Much environmental law, especially in 
the pollution control branch, seeks to avoid and remediate damage done to the 
environment. Conservation legislation often promises that the last, best, untouched, 
intact, or untainted places will be preserved. Both branches of environmental law 
ultimately envision a final environmental condition that achieves social objectives 
and then maintains them. Though all generations observe environmental variability, 
the changes we observe today are qualitatively different, accelerating at historically 
unprecedented rates, and unravelling ecosystems. We need new organizing 
principles to reconcile social demands with ever-more dynamic natural systems. 
Over the past several years, the concept of resilience has gained currency in 
conservation circles for understanding our world.3 As an organizing framework, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. DANIEL B. BOTKIN, DISCORDANT HARMONIES: A NEW ECOLOGY FOR THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY 6–13 (1990); Fred P. Bosselman & A. Dan Tarlock, The Influence of 
Ecological Science on American Law: An Introduction, 69 CHI-KENT L. REV. 847, 855 (1994).  
 2. See, e.g., Reed F. Noss, Some Principles of Conservation Biology, as They Apply to 
Environmental Law, 69 CHI-KENT L. REV. 893, 894–95 (1994) (arguing that the 
unpredictability and disequilibrium of nature requires a legal response that prioritizes 
sustaining the large landscapes); Julianne Lutz Newton & Eric T. Freyfogle, Sustainability: A 
Dissent, 19 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 23, 28 (2005) (tracing the roots of sustainability 
objectives and highlighting the challenges of applying it to ecological systems). 
 3. See generally MELINDA HARM BENSON & ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG, THE END OF 
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resilience offers the promise of improving decisions about pollution, resource 
extraction, and environmental management. The property of resilience observed in 
social-ecological systems does explain much of what we observe. As such, it is an 
essential consideration in devising realistic priorities for what we would like 
environmental law to achieve.  
The ecologist Buzz Holling’s seminal article defined resilience as the ability of a 
system to absorb changes yet still persist.4 For law and other systems that include 
people, resilience describes the continuity of relationships within a system. 
Resilience “is a measure of the ability of these systems to absorb changes” yet still 
provide the same function, structure, and identity.5 The dynamic system “human-
bike” illustrates the concept of resilience.6 This system has two equilibrium states: 
(1) the standard forward motion while riding the bike and (2) flat on the ground, 
stationary. From the position of the first state, suppose the rider hits a bump. The 
bike starts to wobble. If the wobble attenuates and steady forward motion resumes, 
then the resilience of the system absorbed the disturbance and returned to the prior 
state. Even if the forward motion does not resume in exactly the same manner, say 
because the bump bent the tire in a minor fashion, the system is in a forward motion 
state but may not be as productive. In that case, the bump modified the system. But 
the system retains its function, structure, and identity. If the wobble amplifies and 
the bike crashes to the ground, then the disturbance triggered a change into a different 
equilibrium state. The greater the bump the system can absorb without causing the 
rider to fall, the greater the resilience of the human-bike forward-motion state.  
The social-ecological systems resilience literature explores how large an 
exogenous shock—the bump in the road—the system can endure and recover its 
original equilibrium. It is also about the other equilibria that the system might 
transform into if subject to a great enough disturbance. The disturbance may be a 
human intervention, such as a species introduction or overfishing. Or, it may be a 
hurricane or an epidemic. Some systems may have more than two stable states.7  
                                                                                                                 
 
SUSTAINABILITY: RESILIENCE AND THE FUTURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE IN THE 
ANTHROPOCENE (2017); Tracy-Lynn Humby, Law and Resilience: Mapping the Literature, 4 
SEATTLE J. ENVTL. L. 85 (2014). 
 4. C.S. Holling, Resilience and Stability of Ecological Systems, 4 ANN. REV. 
ECOLOGICAL SYS. 1, 17 (1973). 
 5. Marco A. Janssen & Elinor Ostrom, Resilience, Vulnerability, and Adaptation: A 
Cross-Cutting Theme of the International Human Dimensions Programme on Environmental 
Change, 16 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 237, 237 (2006); see also Brian Walker, Lance 
Gunderson, Ann Kinzig, Carl Folke, Steve Carpenter & Lisen Schultz, A Handful of Heuristics 
and Some Propositions for Understanding Resilience in Social-Ecological Systems, 11 
ECOLOGY & SOC’Y, no. 1, 2006.  
 6. Thanks to Professor Kerry Krutilla, who described this riding-a-bike analogy to me. 
He and Rafael Reuveny have explored economic approaches to modeling resilience. E.g., 
Kerry Krutilla & Rafael Reuveny, The Systems Dynamics of Endogenous Population Growth 
in a Renewable Resource-Based Growth Model, 56 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 256 (2006); Kerry 
Krutilla & Rafael Reuveny, The Quality of Life in the Dynamics of Economic Development, 7 
ENV’T & DEV. ECON. 23 (2002).   
 7. Donald Ludwig, Brian Walker & Crawford S. Holling, Sustainability, Stability, and 
Resilience, 1 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y, no. 1, 1997. 
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Professor Holling promoted resilience as a way of understanding complex 
ecological systems in 1973. Over the past quarter century, advances in resilience 
research also applied the idea to the human behaviors and institutions that link to 
changes in ecological functioning through a social-ecological systems framework. 
But only in the past decade have legal scholars debated resilience’s significance for 
environmental law. The resilience concept speaks to a yearning in the field of 
environmental law for an organizing principle. And it describes how adaptation to 
climate change may sometimes alter our environment and society while still retaining 
essential functions, structures, and identity. Other times, adaptation may not succeed 
in sustaining the current state of our social-ecological systems.8 Resilience objectives 
upset longstanding expectations of stability and predictability.9 Reforms to law itself, 
aside from the objectives environmental law seeks to achieve, may also benefit from 
insights that emerge from resilient systems research. This Article reckons with all 
these implications of resilience for environmental law. 
Part I discusses environmental law and revives an old debate about whether the 
field revolves around a central, organizing principle. Part II describes how the 
resilience framework can improve environmental management. Resilience, 
fundamentally, is an emergent property of systems, not a normative theory.10 To 
employ resilience in setting environmental goals, we must pour social and ethical 
content into it. In other words, resilience gets us nowhere without deciding resilience 
of what, to what, and for whom. Such devilish details arise in any framework we 
choose. A new paradigm sounds momentous but may instead be only so much 
rearranging of deck chairs.  
If resilience will prompt a different way of governing our disputes over the 
environment, it must respond to a key question addressed in Part III: Can resilience 
provide what people demand of environmental law? Stability and predictability are 
often at the core of our interests with respect to the environment.11 For pollution, we 
want ecosystems to absorb and detoxify contaminants, as rivers do for much of what 
we discharge. For natural resource conservation, we want a steady flow of food, fiber, 
energy, minerals, and environmental services, such as flood control. Sustainability 
promised all that.12 Resilience recognizes that the environment does not always 
respond the way we desire or forecast.13 Ecosystems that have historically delivered 
in a predictable fashion are increasingly failing to meet our expectations.14 We must 
therefore reshape those expectations and the systems that govern how we manage the 
environment.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 8. This is one reason why climate-change mitigation through reduction and removal of 
greenhouse gases from the atmosphere is important. 
 9. Melinda Harm Benson, Reconceptualizing Environmental Challenges—Is Resilience 
the New Narrative?, 21 J. ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILITY L. 99, 116 (2015); J.B. Ruhl, General 
Design Principles for Resilience and Adaptive Capacity in Legal Systems—With Applications 
to Climate Change Adaptation, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1373, 1374, 1386 (2011) (discussing stability 
and predictability, respectively). 
 10. Ruhl, supra note 9, at 1394–95. 
 11. See Benson, supra note 9, at 125. 
 12. BENSON & CRAIG, supra note 3, at 2–3. 
 13. See id. at 116. 
 14. See id. at 118–19. 
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Even if resilience does provide a superior framework for setting goals, we must 
consider whether the design of environmental law itself needs to be more resilient. 
Part IV considers whether doctrines, statutes, and regulations themselves need to be 
resilient in order to promote resilient social-ecological systems (SES). Law reform 
enhancing resilience of statutory and administrative activities must create a better 
framework for the moral calculus of justice and participation. It also must operate in 
a flexible, adaptive manner and provide avenues to work across jurisdictional 
boundaries. 
These sorts of questions have been around for a long time, even predating the 
reform statutes of the 1970s, when environmental law emerged as a field of study. 
So, in puzzling through answers, I build upon the work that has come before and 
focus on how resilience is similar to or different from other ideas adopted and 
discarded over the past century. Resilience is unlikely to be a flash-in-the-pan. Unlike 
sustainability, it is a fundamental attribute of the world. It is also deeply embedded 
in the social objectives of climate-change adaptation.15 It fundamentally addresses 
the environment, but its role in environmental law is far less clear. This Article 
proposes a way of thinking about resilience in environmental law rather than a 
particular set of reforms. Environmental law research in the coming years should 
consider specific, place-based approaches to the management of resilience and safe-
fail designs that produce adaptive governance. 
I. DOES ENVIRONMENTAL LAW NEED AN OVERARCHING GOAL? 
Modern environmental law grew in the late 1960s and early 70s as Congress 
awoke to public discontent with the ability of courts and states to safeguard public 
health and conserve the natural world.16 Even in its middle age, American 
environmental law has never completely shaken its inferiority complex as a 
newcomer to the repertoire of fields in legal scholarship.17 Is it enough to say that 
environmental law is about resolving disputes concerning use of public resources? 
Environmental law seeks to optimize allocation but also to distribute goods and 
services in an equitable fashion.18 In doing so, environmental law comprises a 
hodgepodge of statutes and agency procedures, with a dash of common law property 
and torts. A survey of statutory, positive environmental law may be no less coherent 
                                                                                                                 
 
 15. BENSON & CRAIG, supra note 3, at 4; C.S. Holling & Lance H. Gunderson, Resilience 
and Adaptive Cycles, in PANARCHY: UNDERSTANDING TRANSFORMATIONS IN HUMAN AND 
NATURAL SYSTEMS 25, 27–30 (Lance H. Gunderson & C.S. Holling eds., 2002). 
 16. See RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 178–79 (2004) 
(explaining that the technological and economic complexities of pollution control are beyond 
the institutional competence of courts); Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: 
Historical Roots and Contemporary Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141, 1144 (1995) (attributing 
the rise of federal environmental law to the failure of states to protect their citizens). 
 17. This perception is belied by the existence of legal decisions concerning air pollution 
problems for centuries before the emergence of modern environmental law. See, e.g., PETER 
BRIMBLECOMBE, THE BIG SMOKE: A HISTORY OF AIR POLLUTION IN LONDON SINCE MEDIEVAL 
TIMES 9–16 (1987). 
 18. LAZARUS, supra note 16, at 24–28. 
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or structured than the standard property law class.19 But its relative youth exacerbates 
the nagging doubts that environmental law is simply a grab bag of problems that 
share some connection to the environment.20 If environmental law is nothing beyond 
a messy compilation of statutes, rules, and cases resolving disputes over competition 
for natural resources, then it is ultimately an empty vessel. Lawmakers will fill it 
with the principles of ownership, tortious proximate causation, administrative and 
civil procedure, as well as statutory interpretation.  
Professor Tarlock grappled with the legal content of environmental law when he 
asked, “Is there a there there?”21 Tarlock noted the least satisfactory response is 
simply that environmental law exists, and its content is the “there.”22 Generations of 
environmental law students can attest that there is no shortage of content to be 
discovered by diving deep into statutory detail and regulatory morass. But, does that 
content contribute anything special to the law in order to justify a category of 
research? A category of law beyond just a subject of legislation requires a special set 
of principles that cohere. Tarlock worried that the lack of integration of 
environmental law into the older doctrines of the legal system leaves it “vulnerable 
to marginalization as support for environmentalism ebbs and flows.”23 Federal 
environmental law is particularly vulnerable because, unlike the state constitutions, 
the U.S. Constitution provides weak footing for environmental legislation. In an 
important sense, the challenge of framing environmental law is little different from 
other areas of law that emerged from problems beyond the ken of the founders, such 
as antitrust or labor.24 To be a distinct field, environmental law needs a framework 
to resolve disputes in a way that consistently advances a broader goal. Resilience as 
an overarching theme for environmental law can help resist centrifugal tendencies of 
an otherwise fragmented collection of statutes and doctrines.25 
A recent example of how the under-theorized content of environmental law can 
undermine attempts to improve environmental management is Michigan v. EPA.26 In 
that 2015 decision, a bare majority of the U.S. Supreme Court found that the agency 
could not set an emission standard for hazardous air pollutants without considering 
the cost to the power plants.27 The Clean Air Act (CAA) requires the EPA to control 
                                                                                                                 
 
 19. See James Grimmelmann, Real + Imaginary = Complex: Toward a Better Property 
Course, 66 J. LEGAL EDUC. 930, 935 (2017). 
 20. A. Dan Tarlock, Is There a There There in Environmental Law?, 19 J. LAND USE & 
ENVTL. L. 213, 215–16 (2004). 
 21. Id.  
 22. Id. at 215–17. 
 23. Id. at 217. 
 24. Id. at 226–28. 
 25. Public health and welfare are traditional frameworks for deciding on many goals of 
environmental law, such as setting uniform ambient air pollution standards. 42 U.S.C. § 
7409(b) (2012) (defining primary standards for public health and secondary standards for 
public welfare). But those concepts offer little guidance on the process by which 
environmental management can deliver on the goals. Recent research, however, connects the 
effects of climate change to adverse impacts on public health. Jonathan A. Patz & Madeleine 
C. Thomson, Climate Change and Health: Moving from Theory to Practice, 15 PLOS MED., 
no. 7, 2018.  
 26. 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015). 
 27. Id. In reviewing the EPA determination, the Court interpreted a Clean Air Act 
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certain pollutants if it concludes that “regulation is appropriate and necessary.”28 
Relying on the fidelity of environmental law to protecting public health, the EPA 
emphasized the CAA’s goal of avoiding the injuries, morbidity, and mortality 
“reasonably anticipated to occur” from the emissions.29 Yet the majority of the 
Supreme Court applied only the general principles of administrative law and 
statutory construction in concluding that costs must be a part of the EPA’s 
considerations in order to produce an “appropriate and necessary” rule.30 If the 
Supreme Court understood environmental law as a field advancing a central precept 
of precaution, then one justice may have switched sides and the EPA would not be 
considering costs in deciding whether to regulate hazardous air pollution, especially 
mercury, to avoid reasonably anticipated harms to human health. Instead, cost 
analysis would be deferred to the later step of deciding what kind of emission 
restrictions should apply to the power plants. 
Another problem with a pure positivist response to the question of what is 
distinctive about the content of environmental law is that it offers little guidance on 
how to reform statutes and rules. If environmental law is simply the statutes and 
judicial precedent, then it would seem stubbornly resistant to adapting to new 
conditions or improved understanding.31 This positivist view may well explain the 
current ossification of environmental law legislation, where infrequent amendments 
generally reflect only a shift in political power rather than adaptation to new 
circumstances and knowledge.32  
Depending on how one circumscribes the domain of environmental law, the 
strongest overarching theme is caution.33 This essential conservatism of 
environmental law developed in response to the shortcomings of common law in 
responding to prospective, probabilistic harms that are often far removed in time and 
space from multiple, synergetic causes. Building on the work of Professor Sax,34 
Professor Lazarus distilled the essential premise of environmental law as an 
understanding that “the physical characteristics of the ecosystem generate spatial and 
temporal spillovers that require restrictions on the private use of natural resources far 
                                                                                                                 
 
provision relating to power plant emissions that authorizes regulatory controls if the agency 
“finds such regulation is appropriate and necessary.” 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A) (2012). 
 28. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A) (2012). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2707–11. 
 31. Tarlock, supra note 20, at 232. 
 32. Victor B. Flatt, Frozen in Time: The Ossification of Environmental Statutory Change 
and the Theatre of the (Administrative) Absurd, 24 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 125, 125–27 
(2013). A recent example of an infrequent amendment may be found in the massive 
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-141, Division N—BUILD Act 
(changing and clarifying federal law governing liability for hazardous waste sites in order to 
promote redevelopment of abandoned industrial locations). 
 33. See, e.g., Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978) (interpreting 
Endangered Species Act as a congressional policy of “institutionalized caution” to avoid 
extinctions); LAZARUS, supra note 16, at 23–24; A. Dan Tarlock, The Future of Environmental 
“Rule of Law” Litigation, 17 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 237, 239 (2000). 
 34. See generally Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE 
L.J. 149 (1971). 
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beyond those contemplated by centuries-old common law tort rules.”35 The same can 
be said of the social characteristics.36 Cognizant of the exorbitance or impossibility 
of reversing environmental injury, environmental law generally takes a preventive 
rather than a remedial stance, though there are exceptions, notably the Superfund 
legislation.37 Lazarus tallied five key attributes: complexity, scientific uncertainty, 
dynamism, precaution, and controversy.38 Of those five, the first three relate to the 
environment itself. Controversy relates to the politics of environmental law. 
Precaution is the key attribute that defines the law itself.39  
Conservatism over safety and hesitance to transform ecological systems are 
relatively new to the “internal logic” of the common law tradition.40 This may explain 
the hostility of much of the current political “conservatives” to environmental law. 
They rouse skepticism of the science and economics that justify wide swaths of 
environmental regulation.41 Tarlock claimed that environmental law is revolutionary 
in that it challenges the settled expectations that remain the primary objective of 
traditional common law. “Adaptation to changed social conditions are often 
subordinated to the twin values of stability and predictability.”42 The revolutionary 
project of redefining harm as long term “risk of future illness or ecosystem 
malfunction rather than immediate” effects has proven slow to permeate legal 
institutions outside of those subject to the explicit commands of legislation.43  
Tarlock ultimately settled on the procedural innovations of environmental law as 
its greatest contribution to legal thought. Using the National Environmental Policy 
Act (NEPA)44 environmental impact analysis requirement as the paradigmatic 
example, Tarlock found that environmental law is less concerned with consistent 
outcomes than it is toward fidelity to process.45 Where science fails to transform legal 
standards, procedure can bring rationality to bear on specific decisions. Of course, 
lawyers—by training—love process. Yet, the procedural foundations of 
environmental law rest upon the crumbling faith in “comprehensive rationality” as a 
feasible way to account for the effects of activities that impact the environment. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 35. LAZARUS, supra note 16, at 121. J.B. Ruhl and James Salzman’s Climate Change, 
Dead Zones, and Massive Problems in the Administrative State: A Guide for Whittling Away, 
98 CALIF. L. REV. 59 (2010), points out that even statutory solutions often address only small 
slices of a larger, complex problem with spillover effects.  
 36. Michael D. McGinnis & Elinor Ostrom, Social-Ecological System Framework: Initial 
Changes and Continuing Challenges, 19 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y, no. 2, 2014. 
 37. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, Pub. L. 
No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675). 
 38. LAZARUS, supra note 16, at 16. 
 39. Precaution is also a core principle of common law torts, though it does not inevitably 
take the form of a strong precautionary “principle.” Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, 
and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1985).  
 40. Tarlock, supra note 20, at 222. 
 41. See, e.g., NAOMI ORESKES & ERIK M. CONWAY, MERCHANTS OF DOUBT: HOW A 
HANDFUL OF SCIENTISTS OBSCURED THE TRUTH ON ISSUES FROM TOBACCO SMOKE TO GLOBAL 
WARMING (2010). 
 42. Tarlock, supra note 20, at 236. 
 43. Id. at 237. 
 44. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4335 (2012). 
 45. Tarlock, supra note 20, at 239–40. 
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Comprehensive rationality relies on the power of foresight to accurately predict the 
effects of actions.46 Adaptation to climate change and other factors leading to new 
ranges of variation of environmental conditions and ecosystem phase changes will 
require a new legal process, even if mitigation reduces the long-term magnitude of 
the climate shifts.47 Devising a better framework for environmental decision-making 
is therefore an essential task for environmental law scholarship. 
II. WOULD RESILIENCE PROVIDE A USEFUL FRAMEWORK  
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL LAW? 
Environmental law is one element in a system of governance, which is a process 
of setting goals and achieving them through social institutions. In part because of its 
defensive grasping for some core principle to claim, environmental law scholarship 
tends toward over-eager embrace of the latest trends. In the 1980s, sustainability (or, 
“sustainable development” in the international law context)48 became a common 
theme of environmental reform proposals.49 Sustainability is a helpful prompt for 
identifying overexploitation of resources before they crash and for intergenerational 
equity. But it is opaque when it comes to understanding sustainability of what. The 
very ambiguity that allowed sustainable development to be widely hailed—that it 
could be interpreted by different interests as sustaining their own needs—
undermined its usefulness.50 Sustaining business productivity, ecological services, 
and social goods all at once often proves an impossible balancing act.51 Something 
has to give. In practice, the short-term exigencies of economic productivity 
                                                                                                                 
 
 46. See generally Bryan D. Jones, Bounded Rationality, 2 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 297, 299 
(1999) (describing comprehensive rationality); Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of 
“Muddling Through,” 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 79, 79–80 (1959) (attempts to manage public 
programs with comprehensive rationality generally fail); Charles E. Lindblom, Still Muddling, 
Not Yet Through, 39 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 517, 517–18 (1979) (updating and confirming his 1959 
arguments).  
 47. J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Climate Change Meets the Law of the Horse, 62 DUKE 
L.J. 975, 1018 (2013). 
 48. WORLD COMM’N ON ENV’T & DEV., OUR COMMON FUTURE (1987) (commonly 
referred to as the “Brundtland Report” after the chair of the Commission, former Norwegian 
prime minister Gro Harlem Brundtland). 
 49. See Keith H. Hirokawa, Saving Sustainability, 46 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 
10,151 (2016). 
 50. Humby, supra note 3, at 86 (observing on Google’s “Ngram Viewer” a clear trend in 
the decline of “sustainable development” relative to “resilience”). Professor Humby predicts 
that resilience could suffer the same fate if the term becomes “an empty signifier.” Id. at 88. 
She echoes Professor Doremus’s earlier warning that broad concepts can be used by agencies 
“as a ploy to placate demands for environmental protection without actually imposing any 
enforceable constraints on themselves.” Holly Doremus, Adaptive Management, the 
Endangered Species Act, and the Institutional Challenges of “New Age” Environmental 
Protection, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 50, 53 (2001). Lynton Keith Caldwell memorably fretted that 
“sustainable development” risked becoming “a thought-stopping cliché.” LYNTON KEITH 
CALDWELL, BETWEEN TWO WORLDS: SCIENCE, THE ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT, AND POLICY 
CHOICE ix (1990).  
 51. See Newton & Freyfogle, supra note 2, at 26. 
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overshadow environmental and social aims.52 The Trump Administration’s 
objectives with respect to energy roughly translate to sustainability: that is, 
sustainability of current fossil fuel energy systems to growing social concern over 
the global injustice of climate change, for people who benefit from the industry and 
are largely insulated from its adverse impacts.53  
Sustainability assumes both that we understand what can be sustained, and that 
we have the capacity to carry out what is necessary to maintain those conditions 
indefinitely.54 But that assumption is not justifiable for the vast majority of social-
ecological systems. A term associated with the “Ostrom School” of political 
science,55 “social-ecological systems” (SES) encompasses the connected social, 
economic, and environmental relationships involved in such activities as farming or 
managing urban stormwater.56 Professor Ostrom took the ecological resilience 
concept of Holling and extended it by observing the order in the relationship between 
and among the environment and the people who shape and use it.57 She generalized 
the ecological principle to describe resilience as “the amount of disruption needed to 
transform a system from one stability domain (characterized by a configuration of 
mutually reinforcing processes and structures) to another.”58 
Social-ecological systems are complex. Rather than simplify them into sustained 
outputs, resilience recognizes that dynamic conditions (and our understanding of 
them) are relatively unpredictable.59 Disruptive change can occur quickly and 
nonlinearly. The resilience of a system is the extent to which it can respond to 
stressors and retain its essential form.60 When systems cross critical thresholds, then 
they transform into different phases.61 A familiar example is a clear lake that absorbs 
nutrient inputs and purifies water. The lake’s resilience describes the stock and flow 
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of nutrients it can absorb without flipping into a eutrophic phase dominated by algae. 
Once the lake transforms into a eutrophic state, it may no longer “bounce back” to 
reorganize into a clear lake even if the nutrient flows abate. Humpty Dumpty is not 
easily put back together. Social systems, such as banking, undergo similar resilient 
behavior—the subprime mortgage business hummed along steadily until it 
dramatically crashed into a completely different phase in 2008.62 As complex as our 
economy or an ecosystem may be, the interactions between the two in a social-
ecological system complicate the picture even more.  
For instance, kelp forests are highly biologically diverse, structurally complex, 
and highly productive ecosystems that occur in mid-latitude, cold-water, rocky 
coastal waters.63 When fishing depletes the population of top predators, herbivorous 
sea urchins may proliferate and eat enough kelp to crash the ecosystem and produce 
an entirely different ecological state.64 This occurred along the U.S. Pacific Coast 
after sea otters largely disappeared. But, in the western North Atlantic, after the 
commercial fishing industry decimated predatory fishes, especially cod, large crabs 
thrived in the vacant niche and began reducing the urchin populations, keeping the 
kelp forests intact.65 Such are the unpredictable, disparate outcomes of the coupled 
SES. And, these examples simplify phase changes because many SES have multiple 
equilibria, not just two states.66 
A. The Social Dimension of Resilience 
Despite the contingent uncertainty, we need an environmental law objective to 
recognize that humans always alter nature and are altered by it.67 This is the essential 
insight of the Ostrom institutional analysis and development framework, which 
builds on the inevitable ecological context that shapes social institutions.68 Resilience 
can guide answers to the questions of how much, where, and (with its social 
dimension) for whom. Sometimes sustainability and resilience objectives will 
correspond to the same procedures and outcomes. For instance, the recovery and 
maintenance of migratory waterfowl is among the greatest sustainability success 
stories of twentieth century America.69 This management of bird populations and 
hunting within a consistent band of variation was accomplished with the tool of 
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adaptive management.70 But past success is no longer an indicator of the future. 
Prairie potholes of the upper Great Plains, important nesting habitats for a large 
proportion of migratory waterfowl, are drying up because the agricultural economy 
demands more drainage and because climatic change reduces available 
precipitation.71 Wintering habitat south of the United States is disappearing under 
human population and economic pressures.72 Signals that trigger seasonal migrations 
in many birds are no longer in sync with food sources, such as insect larvae emerging 
earlier in the spring, before the birds can arrive to eat them.73 That also may affect 
the forests where more larvae consume more leaves. At the same time, in addition to 
the economic drivers of farming practices in the upper Great Plains and Latin 
America, migratory bird hunting has been declining in the United States over the past 
forty years.74 That trend results in less habitat-conservation funding generated 
through mandatory “duck stamps” that the hunters must purchase and affix to their 
hunting licenses. Some North American bird migrations may well be an example of 
a social-ecological system nearing a resilience limit. 
System resilience is not always good or bad from the point of view of social 
goals.75 Most people would say that we should try to maintain North American bird 
migration in its current state by enhancing resilience to change through such practices 
as better water management in the upper Great Plains.76 But, the organizing principle 
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of resilience may lead us to social choices that push other systems across phase-
change boundaries. For resilience is not always associated with health or with an 
environment that functions in a way that benefits us. “Pathologically resilient” 
systems can trap management with institutions resistant to change but unable to 
withstand change.77 The doomed Everglades provides one example where a resilient 
web of water governance institutions thwarts the kind of adaptive change necessary 
to maintain the unique ecosystem.78 Yet, the traps of pathological resilience can yield 
to transformation. A legal objective may sometimes promote not the strengthening 
of resistance to change but instead an action to transform a system into another 
state.79  
For instance, Pleasant Run is a twenty-seven mile-long waterway in Indianapolis 
that lost ecological functions over the past century of development.80 Urban 
infrastructure and impermeable surfaces currently provide relatively few ecological 
and social services to relatively poor residents.81 One legitimate way of thinking 
about a goal for the Pleasant Run SES is to nudge it into a new bounded-equilibrium 
state that better serves the people in the area and downstream. Indeed, one reason 
why funding is available for altering the system is that federal law mandates 
Indianapolis abate stormwater pollution and slow the ever-increasing surges of raw 
sewage runoff into the White River after even normal rainfall events.82 Most debates 
about applying resilience as a legal objective arise in the preservationist context of 
enhancing resilience and keeping systems within the limits to avoid disruptive 
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transformation.83 But Pleasant Run shows that resilience is equally helpful in framing 
a legal system that facilitates transformations to new conditions that better serve 
people. Cities will be the testing grounds for transformative management that aims 
to shift the role of waterways from hidden pipes or open sewers to community 
gathering grounds that provide a diversity of goods and services. To the extent 
compliance with the Clean Water Act motivates these urban watershed experiments 
in governance, it is an example of a static environmental law pushing for dynamic 
phase changes to SES. 
Whether the socially constructed aim is enhancing resilience to resist regime 
change or pushing a system into a new phase, the process of environmental 
management is the same. This is an important point because, in practice, 
conservation often focuses solely on resisting the transformative effects of change 
even when transformation seems inevitable, such as in the context of the threat to 
coastal wetlands from sea level rise.84 Equating resilience in environmental law with 
strengthening social-ecological systems by resisting phase changes is a blinkered 
misunderstanding of resilience as sustainability.85 Instead, adaptive governance to 
promote transformation will become increasingly important, and not just in ill-
functioning urban watersheds. Perhaps our greatest current environmental challenge 
is decarbonizing our energy systems. Resilient approaches to address the challenge, 
such as the “Deep Decarbonization Pathways Project,”86 will employ law reform to 
drive a transformation in the social-ecological system of energy production and use.87 
Whether at the scale of a local watershed or a national energy system, transformative 
governance provides hope to people shut out of previous conceptions of 
environmental decision-making.  
Emphasizing the notion that environmental law is for people—provisioning their 
wants and resolving their disputes—resilience of social-ecological systems steers us 
away from dualist notions of nature versus society that seldom help the 
environmentalist cause. For instance, Greg Siekaniec, Alaska regional director of the 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, commented on the dispute over whether to drill for 
oil on the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. He said that America’s refuges are 
dedicated to “wildlife conservation over human use.”88 A resilience framework 
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would consider wildlife conservation to be an objective for human use. The two are 
linked in a social-ecological system. Dualism sets up false choices.  
Isolating the social from the ecological led the Idaho Supreme Court to deny 
federal reserved water rights for Deer Flat National Wildlife Refuge.89 Federal public 
land law reserves to the United States implied water rights needed to avoid frustration 
of the primary purpose for creating the reserve.90 President Franklin Roosevelt 
created Deer Flat Refuge to provide breeding and resting grounds for native birds on 
islands in the Snake River.91 As part of Idaho’s adjudication of water rights on the 
Snake, the supreme court rejected the United States’ claim that the reservation 
required enough water to flow through the Snake by the islands, during bird breeding 
season, to ensure that nests remain isolated from the river banks.92 Without those 
instream flow rights, irrigation upstream of the refuge sometimes lowers water flows 
so much that the refuge islands become peninsulas. The low flows subject nesting 
birds to predators. The Idaho court held that denying the water rights and allowing 
the land bridges to form between the islands and the river banks would not defeat the 
primary purpose of the refuge.93 It justified its position by explaining that the 
president intended the refuge to benefit humans as the primary focus. The court wrote 
that it is “inconceivable that President Roosevelt . . . intended to give preference to 
waterfowl, or any other migratory bird, over people.”94 A more honest assessment of 
the decision is that it shifted the Snake River SES from serving some people who 
benefit from birds to other people who benefit from more irrigation diversions. 
In severing conservation from benefits to people, the court misunderstood the role 
of wildlife in the environmental law. In a political competition between people and 
other animals, always bet on people. Resilience as an organizing principle of 
environmental law makes it easier to see how the two are inseparable. Hunters of 
caribou and waterfowl well south of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge breeding 
grounds are part of that refuge’s social-ecological system. So are birdwatchers and 
others who enjoy wildlife observation. And, we should not discount the role of the 
arctic systems in supporting agriculture itself, through the arctic breeding of birds 
that reduce crop loss by eating insect pests far from their summer range.  
B. Managing Resilience through Adaptation 
One reason that resilience works so well for environmental law is that it is not 
easily confused with an outcome, as is the case with sustainability. Properly 
understood, resilience is a property we need to work with, in pursuing our social 
vision.  
A resilience approach emphasizes combined strategies of enhancing 
resistance (e.g., survival and persistence), recovery (re-establishing the 
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prior community following disturbance), and reorganization (allowing 
new suites of species to colonize an area that may be more adaptive under 
new conditions, and facilitating geographic migration of species). In this 
framework, new species moving into an area may be viewed [not simply 
as an invasive bad. It may instead reflect] an ecological response to 
climate pressure, and assisted migration techniques may be needed to 
conserve species whose climate envelope has shifted.95 
Environmental law is fundamentally procedural rather than substantive.96 It is a way 
of allocating rights and responsibilities, considering impacts (such as through 
NEPA),97 setting goals (such as water quality standards),98 managing harmful 
activities (such as air pollution emissions),99 and translating land management 
objectives (such as healthy populations of wildlife) to particular contexts (such as a 
particular wildlife refuge).100 
The process and systems view of environmental law is particularly important in 
addressing the epochal challenge of climate change. Without a coherent theory of 
environmental law, addressing climate change may deliver “emergent harms” 
resulting from uncoordinated approaches or neglect of how solutions redistribute 
social costs and benefits.101 Reforming environmental law, therefore, will not be so 
different from creating environmental law. The birth of the modern era of federal 
environmental law can be fairly traced to Congress’ 1969 enactment of NEPA.102 
The NEPA action-forcing mechanism of environmental impact analysis sought to 
integrate many different fields of study to provide a comprehensive understanding of 
all the consequences from a proposed course of action (and its alternatives).103 
Today, we need analyses that retain the social-ecological integration but provide 
more iterative adjustments than the front-loaded NEPA and the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA) requirements.  
Adaptive management fits that bill by treating actions or policies as experiments 
to test hypotheses about how the social-ecological system responds to human 
alterations.104 The speed with which legal institutions and statutes integrate adaptive 
management will indicate the degree to which resilience emerges as a framework for 
environmental law. Adaptive management needs continual monitoring and flexibility 
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to tinker with environmental management.105 Those needs require legal reform. 
Adaptive management requires breathing space to allow learning to occur and 
actions to be altered in response to previous cycles of action.106 Federal agencies have 
succeeded in undertaking adaptive management within the framework of NEPA, but 
it is an awkward fit with the comprehensive rationality of administrative law.107 The 
next era of environmental law will require creation of iterative processes that provide 
the public input and analytical rigor of NEPA but that allow for more 
experimentation.108 Adaptive management works best in highly resilient systems, 
which are more forgiving of misguided interventions seeking to preserve the 
ecological goods and services demanded by people.109 A resilience framework for 
regulation of potentially harmful or polluting technologies may similarly adapt to 
unanticipated effects through ex post adjustments.110 
Another challenge for implementing adaptive management in environmental law 
is to retain flexibility yet actually impose enforceable constraints on actions that 
affect resilience in an undesirable way.111 Practitioners of adaptive management need 
new legal frameworks that force them to state measurable objectives for an action 
and to identify thresholds that will trigger specific responses to monitoring.112 
Otherwise, management may drift from its objectives. As Professor Camacho 
observes, “providing ad hoc, vague directives for experimental, collaborative 
regulatory processes invites delay and indecision to the detriment of those resources 
harmed by inaction.”113 
C. Resilience in Environmental Law Scholarship 
The notion that resilience can fill the hollow soul of environmental law is 
increasingly popular in environmental law scholarship, though the amount of 
commentary is still relatively small. A Westlaw search of law journal articles 
containing the term “resilience” in a title yielded 114 publications as of December 
31, 2017.114 Of these, ninety-eight articles substantively grappled with some aspect 
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of resilience. Since 2000, when the first article applying resilience to environmental 
law appeared,115 resilience has become a popular term in many legal specialties. For 
instance, twelve articles applied the term in its psychological sense to mean the 
capacity to recover from harm and setbacks.116 Other fields engage with resilience, 
but at lower frequencies: four articles applied resilience to financial regulation, four 
to cybersecurity and information law, and three to health care.117  
No other subject matter of law journal articles comes close to environmental law 
in its depth of scholarly discussion of resilience. A narrow scope of articles about 
pollution control and resource management yields twenty-eight publications on 
resilience. Broadening the environmental law category to include urban planning, 
land use, infrastructure, disaster mitigation, and U.S. food security, yields fifty-two 
articles total.118 After a lone analysis of informal institutions in 2000, no 
environmental law article indicated a focus on resilience in its title until 2007. Since 
then, all years but 2011 have seen publication of at least one environmental law 
article on resilience. Nonetheless, it is a trickle of scholarship, except for the three 
years when law reviews published symposia on the subject.119 An article title search 
provides only a rough guide and surely undercounts articles dealing with resilience 
in environmental law. For instance, one of the contributions to a symposium on 
“Assessing Law, Resilience and Governance in Regional Socio-Ecological Water 
Systems Facing a Changing Climate” does not contain the word “resilience” in its 
title even though the article discusses resilience extensively in the context of 
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Anna K. Schwab & David J. Brower, Increasing Resilience to Natural Hazards: Obstacles 
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Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,171 (disaster mitigation) (2008). 
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governance and adaptive capacity to climate change in the Everglades.120 Therefore, 
I did not count it in my rough survey. 
Professor Humby conducted a literature review of a broader domain of 
scholarship that included Google Scholar.121 Her larger sample provided a smoother 
picture of increased commentary over the past two decades. My review confirms her 
findings that the adaptability element of resilience is the most common focus of the 
legal literature.122 Reliability, efficiency, scalability, or modularity elements of 
resilience123 are commonly discussed in the legal literature, but not as consistently. 
It is fair to say that a new theme of resilience is emerging and enlivening 
environmental law scholarship. The next Part explores whether that scholarly 
trajectory can spur or parallel a rise in environmental law reform to better account 
for resilience. 
III. CAN RESILIENCE MEET THE DEMANDS SOCIETY PLACES ON THE ENVIRONMENT? 
The fallacy of naturalism cautions that observed attributes of nature are not 
necessarily ethical or suitable goals for humans.124 In adopting a framework for 
setting environmental goals, we need to tread carefully and critically examine 
whether resilience serves the interests and morals of people. The major challenge to 
resilience as an organizing framework is that the legal fidelity to finality and security 
comes from real social demands. People like stability. People rely on the 
environment to provide the goods and services to which they have become 
accustomed. Adults delight when children experience the same parks and fishing 
streams that they recall from their youth. Lenders want assurances that their 
investments will be protected from environmental variability. Property owners 
cherish stability as a core value. How can we reconcile those—sometimes 
unrealistic—demands with the fluid adaptation of resilience?125  
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A. Stasis and Change in the Environment 
A hallmark of system resilience is the capacity to maintain a high level of 
consistency of behavioral structure in the face of a dynamic environment.126 That is 
why it can be easy to confuse resilience with stability. But, some dynamic changes, 
inevitably, push systems over the line into new states that may produce very different 
goods and services. Resilience offers tools to help us grapple with changes in the 
variability of environmental conditions as former standards, such as historical 
benchmarks (e.g., 100-year floods), become unreliable. High variability and low 
predictability are probably the greatest challenges for maintaining resilience and 
adaptive capacity in environmental law.127 
One response is that people must resign themselves to the fact that they can’t 
always get what they want. Law simply cannot deliver certainty in our rapidly 
changing environment, now behaving outside of historical ranges of variation.128 As 
Professors Benson and Craig explain, a resilience framework places people in a role 
“characterized by neither impotence nor omnipotence.”129 In other words, we need 
to manage for human objectives, but we cannot expect success at every turn. What 
was “natural,” such as a particular flood frequency, or “native,” such as a particular 
set of mosquito species, is no longer a reliable guide for management. Resilience, 
more than sustainability, reminds people that change cannot be halted and that 
change may arrive in sudden bursts, creating “a new abnormal.”130 Ecosystems may 
absorb more and more stress and continue to produce services—until they flip into a 
different state, perhaps in a short time frame.131 Other environmental changes sound 
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gradual, such as a 3mm/year rise in global sea levels.132 A snail could outwalk that 
disaster! Virginia Beach and Miami Beach experience this consequence of 
greenhouse-gas emissions as a gradual worsening of high-tide flooding. But, climate 
change also increases the intensity of abrupt disasters where ordinary storms produce 
extraordinary flooding, due in part to the higher sea levels or warmer temperatures.133  
Sustainability has a terrible record in fulfilling the promise of stability in such 
environmental goods as public land timber and marine fisheries.134 Even before the 
effects of climate change were felt, ecologists of the 1970s came to realize that 
ecosystems were neither stable, persistent, nor predictable.135 Resilience will promise 
less but deliver more of what it promises. One pitfall to avoid is the tendency to over 
promise, as sustainability often did over the past few decades. Still, resilience, like 
sustainability (or justice, for that matter) is a “malleable term” whose “popularity 
provides only a façade of consensus.”136 One danger of adopting resilience as a legal 
framework is it gives the impression, literally from its etymology, that it will ensure 
that systems “leap back” to their former state after shocks, without permanent 
rupture.137 This is the common understanding of engineering resilience or 
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robustness.138 Ecological resilience, however, is simply the measure of how much 
alteration a system can absorb before losing its ability to recoil.139 Resilience as an 
organizing principle can promise neither to resist change nor to sustain prior outputs 
from social-ecological systems.  
Professors Victor Flatt and Rob Verchick have lamented the repeated use of the 
word “unprecedented” in press coverage of Hurricane Harvey without noting that 
Texas already experienced a 40% increase in intense rainfall from storms over the 
past century.140 In other words, Harvey is the new (ab-)normal even if, strictly 
speaking, it lacks a historical precedent. Shortly after Harvey, Hurricane Irma roared 
into Florida, breaking apart three tower cranes that damaged property as they fell.141 
A decade ago, a state court overturned an attempt by Miami-Dade County to 
strengthen its regulation of cranes, which are currently designed to withstand winds 
up to 145 miles per hour.142 The contractors for one of the buildings where Irma 
destroyed the cranes called the storm “unprecedented” in an effort to shrug off 
responsibility.143 Yet, Irma is consistent with damage we now expect hurricanes to 
inflict on Florida. 
There is some hope for law to consider softening its demand for stability. Over 
the long-term, even the common law shows a willingness to bend to new conditions. 
Many historians describe the nineteenth century shift in riparian water rights from a 
natural flow guarantee to socially contingent, reasonable use as an illustration of 
common law accommodating economic imperatives, such as the industrial revolution 
in a landscape transformed by hydropower mills, dams, and reservoirs.144 Professor 
Smith has shown in a series of articles how common law can and does continue to 
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respond to many changes in social attitudes towards the environment, despite the 
dominance of statutes in the field.145 In particular, Smith demonstrated that common 
law judges are able to contextualize aspects of the environment, such as trees, in 
order to determine when they add value to the landscape and when they may be a 
nuisance.146 Through consideration of the socio-cultural context, a court can act as a 
counterweight to “inflexible environmental statutory directives” and protect the 
social value of stability at least as well as legislators.147 Others have identified an 
evolutionary pattern to statutory environmental law that is not terribly different from 
the resilience of the common law.148 Where and when resistance to phase changes in 
the social-ecological system is futile, resilient law can focus on steering a transition 
from one equilibrium state into another with the least possible system disruption. 
Letting go of stability may benefit many people. Stasis is not an attractive social 
objective for those repressed by discrimination or poverty. The Indianapolis residents 
in the vicinity of Pleasant Run may prefer transformation because they see a more 
prosperous and equitable future under a different social-ecological regime. The 
possibility of transformation in a resilience framework may help expand the 
constituency for environmental law to new supporters who can envision how their 
lives would be improved through adaptive governance. But it does require opening 
the legal debates to new voices, a subject I will tackle in the next Part on whether 
law itself needs to be resilient.  
One important shortcoming of resilience is that its systemic, stochastic approach 
fails to speak in a compelling way to most of the public. People have difficulty seeing 
the world as a chaotic, probabilistic system where causation is seldom direct. People 
respond more strongly to identified, particular individuals facing slight harm than to 
currently unknown, random people facing greater harm.149 Oliver Wendell Holmes 
put the dilemma this way: “most people think dramatically not quantitatively.”150 We 
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can see the faces of the coal miners who may lose their jobs with a carbon tax. But 
there are far more yet-identified people who will die prematurely from asthma and 
other respiratory diseases caused by burning coal. How can law prompt the public to 
care? It can embrace the love that people feel for each other, for other animals, and 
for places, while articulating an inspiring vision. 
On the conservation side of environmental law, advocates have long observed that 
emotion is an important—but often neglected—factor. Resilience seems too cold a 
term to inspire social change. Wendell Berry expressed the concern this way: 
We know enough of our own history by now to be aware that people 
exploit what they have merely concluded to be of value, but they defend 
what they love. To defend what we love we need a particularizing 
language, for we love what we particularly know.151 
Affinity to place motivates environmental protection. The geographer Yi-Fu Tuan 
has called this “affective bond between people and place” topophilia.152 
Environmental law needs to find a better way to take more seriously this human 
yearning for connection.153 Existing conservation programs that offer opportunities 
for people to unplug and engage with nature will need to expand if resilience is to 
serve as a foundational principle of environmental law. 
Though enhancing resilience may increase the prospects for stability of systems, 
it cannot guarantee stasis. What most of us know are ordinary places. Ordinary 
components of the natural side of social-ecological systems play important roles in 
modulating phase changes.154 Environmental law too often arrives late to a crisis, 
when problems are nearly insoluble. This is almost always the case with endangered 
species. The “not knowing what you’ve got until it’s gone”155 syndrome has 
hamstrung environmental law with too many objectives that set it up for failure. 
Greater focus on keeping the common abundant rather than simply trying to nurse 
depleted systems would be a beneficial turn for environmental law. Bird migrations 
are a good example of still-abundant ecological phenomena that can help sustain 
social-ecological systems. Rather than waiting until obligate migrants decline to the 
point of imperilment, taking steps early to secure the long-term future of migration 
would make a greater contribution to social well-being.156 Similarly, concentrating 
area-wide preserves in places of monumental scenery, such as national parks, 
protects only a small global share of biodiversity. Yet, biodiversity is the redundant 
ecological element that maintains resilience. Biodiversity is doomed without 
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ecological connections between park and wildlife reserves, across ordinary 
landscapes.157 That is another reason why demonstration of best conservation 
practices in ordinary places is so important.158 Moreover, the productivity of 
ecological services in ordinary places often far exceeds that of remote 
environments.159 
One approach proposed for managing future environmental conditions that cannot 
sustain historically occurring ecosystems is to deliberately cultivate species and 
services we want.160 Gardening nature is one way to embrace the Anthropocene.161 
Gardening the environment appeals to many Americans’ almost religious sense of 
stewardship.162 It connects care for the backyard with care for the planet. It also 
serves as an apt metaphor for many conservation innovations that will counteract the 
effects of climate change. But, history cautions that what we think we want, from 
channelized rivers to cheap food, may turn out in the end to do more harm than 
good.163  
B. Stasis and Strict Legal Rules 
Humans and our institutions act within systems that both shape and react to nature. 
The SES approach requires better understanding of this middle ground we occupy 
with respect to getting what we want from nature. The American wilderness ideal of 
conservation, with its vision of an unpeopled, untrammeled landscape, is almost 
unique in international environmental law.164 Much to the chagrin of Native 
Americans, whose precolonial activities profoundly shaped the country encountered 
by European settlers, “getting back to nature” has too often required erasing human 
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history.165 Yet, American wilderness preservation has succeeded, against all odds, in 
protecting and restoring cherished places. How it achieved that objective shines a 
light on the greatest weakness of resilience as an overarching goal of environmental 
law.  
The Wilderness Act’s limits on public land development,166 the Endangered 
Species Act’s (ESA) strict prohibitions on jeopardizing imperiled species,167 and the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act’s (RCRA) ban on open dumping168 reflect 
some of the most effective laws because they reject the cost-benefit balancing so 
easily gamed and so often the slippery slope for incremental harms that undermine 
environmental protection. Strict prohibitions may fail to tailor management to local 
context. They appear unyielding and brittle—the antithesis of resilient. But, in 
practical terms, an implementing agency is far too weak to deny powerful economic 
interests their environmental resources without strict prohibitions. Critics assail the 
nonsense behind the vision of an unpeopled history,169 the goal of zero discharge of 
pollutants to the nation’s waters,170 or the hubris of preventing all extinctions.171 Yet, 
without those bright lines constraining behavior, which hardly map on to the continua 
of the environment, we would be living in a less resilient world unable to provide 
many of the services we enjoy. The ESA statutory trigger of jeopardy, for example, 
has been credited with signaling when key ecological thresholds of disruption may 
be crossed and prompting collaborative approaches to water governance.172  
Lawyers who advocate for environmentalist organizations are among the greatest 
critics of law reform that would supplant inflexible, “prohibitive policy”173 with 
softer limitations on private activities or broader discretion for public agencies. There 
may be no place on Earth untrammeled by humans. Some species cannot be rescued 
from extinction. Resilience scholars often push for more flexibility in statutes such 
as the ESA.174 But to replace conceptually flawed yet practically powerful objectives 
with vague missions to garden ecosystems is a recipe for failure. Voluntary, 
polycentric175 collaborative conservation is the gold (green?) standard for successful 
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environmental management. But strict legal thresholds undergird such successes. 
The ESA, in particular, with its divine command to prevent extinctions, is a 
“regulatory driver” of about half of the hundreds of conservation collaborations 
studied by Professors Steven Yaffee and Julia Wondolleck.176  
To declare enhancing resilience a goal and then provide agencies with the latitude 
to garden as they see fit is an approach at odds with history.177 Enforceable standards 
for procedures and outcomes will continue to be necessary.178 Public land law 
transformed in the 1970s in response to inadequate oversight and unmeasurable 
criteria for management.179 Resilience will not work if it means turning back the 
clock on federal natural resources legislation. Pollution control law also transformed 
in the 1970s because insisting on a clear causative connection between a pollution 
source and an undesirable ecological or human health effect proved unworkable.180 
Such an approach is no more feasible today than it was in 1969. 
The greatest promise for resilience is that it may incorporate our understanding of 
how social and environmental systems work together without discarding elements of 
law that have demonstrated their effectiveness.181 There is no doubt that resilience-
rooted environmental law rejects a vision of strict preservationism. Professor Tarlock 
and others warn that dynamic disequilibrium punctures the belief that we can either 
maintain current ecological systems as they are or recover the systems as they once 
existed.182 Climate change and human movements have reshuffled the composition 
of ecosystems and are beginning to reshape the hydrologic, thermal, chemical, and 
biological drivers that create functioning ecological relationships.183 Our postmodern 
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dilemma is that we have no clear reference points anymore for what our environment 
should look like. But, a free-for-all approach to managing the environment will result 
in less rather than more of what we want from nature over the long run. Rejecting 
strict historic restoration or preservation only admits that nature won’t cooperate with 
those goals. Resilience offers a guide for exploring what are reasonable demands to 
make of the environment.  
Just as freshwater lakes may tip from clear to eutrophied, reef systems shift 
between coral domination and macro-algae domination.184 Australia’s Great Barrier 
Reef is the largest living structure on Earth.185 About half the reef that existed in 1985 
is now dead.186 This is a system poised for a transformation to an entirely new phase 
of ecological composition and function.187 But, marine scientists are making progress 
in selective breeding of coral that could result in planting some reefs with more heat-
resistant organisms.188 Such “assisted evolution” may stave off the transformation of 
reef ecosystems into something of less use or beauty to humans. But, where does 
gardening end? Should we replace lodgepole pine forests of the Rockies with more 
beetle-resistant trees? The Great Lakes fisheries with warmer water animals able to 
tolerate greater nutrient pollution? Puget Sound shellfish with cultivars better suited 
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to its acidifying waters? For timber plantations and farm crops, the answers are 
clearly affirmative and consistent with the millennia of human experience with 
improving productivity.  
Should environmental management be more like agricultural practices? Maybe, 
when it comes to retaining some iconic Joshua trees in Joshua Tree National Park.189 
The park area increasingly is too hot and dry to support the eponymous plants. 
Resisting the demise of the trees will require irrigation. Guiding the transformation 
of the ecosystem will require even more intensive management. In either event, 
though, a hands-off approach to let “nature take its course” is unlikely to achieve the 
goal of the national park unit.190 The National Park Service long hewed to the hands-
off approach, best articulated in the 1963 “Leopold Report” that recommended 
preserving park ecosystems in the condition “that prevailed when the area was first 
visited by the white man,” as a “vignette of primitive America.”191 The Park Service 
responded to climate change and theories about ecological disequilibrium by 
emphasizing resilience when it revised the Leopold Report in 2012: 
The overarching goal . . . should be to steward . . . resources for 
continuous change that is not yet fully understood, in order to preserve 
ecological integrity and cultural and historical authenticity, provide 
visitors with transformative experiences, and form the core of a national 
conservation land- and seascape.192 
This goal recognizes not only the disequilibrium of ecosystems, but also the potential 
for a phase change in the social dimension of resilience: “transformative 
experiences.” It is a rare acknowledgement that people may have to fundamentally 
revise their expectations where nature itself cannot fulfill SES objectives. 
Transformative experiences include love of place, which may be necessary to 
motivate public support for resilient conservation.193  
The National Park Service Director adopted the recommendation of the revised 
Leopold Report in a 2016 order that emphasized resilience in resource 
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management.194 But the Trump Administration rescinded the order, presumably 
because of its assertion that the agency needed to respond to climate change.195 
Congress has begun to consider resilience enhancement as a way to resist disruptive 
environmental changes. In its massive Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018, 
Congress created fast-track approval for “wildfire resilience projects” to promote 
retention of old-growth and large trees threatened by insects, disease, and crown 
fires.196 
Gardening suggests a certain level of human mastery over the environment. While 
humans may certainly claim responsibility for profound alterations in the 
environment, our experience cautions against conflating that with mastery over the 
environment. The chaotic, stochastic nature of nature, resilience teaches, will upset 
our expectations in sudden and highly disruptive ways. Professors Craig and Benson 
go so far as to argue that we need new narratives to understand this resilient 
landscape. They look to the myths of the trickster creature, such as the coyote in 
many Native American cultures, to frame narratives that will increase the public’s 
comfort with the realities of unwanted change.197 Stability we crave, but it is 
exceedingly difficult to engineer in a complex, adaptive system. The greatest 
challenge for resilience as an environmental law objective is that it will not fulfill the 
expectation of sustaining what we like. But, it can guide us generally in a direction 
that can retain as much as we can under the circumstances. 
Environmental governance is a continuum of practices in between the two 
extreme poles of preserving historical landscapes on one hand, and gardening 
entirely novel ecosystems on the other.198 In fact, untamed, primeval nature has 
always been an ideal rather than a reality in environmental law. Gardening as a 
metaphor for incremental adjustments in response to management activities that also 
serve as adaptive experiments is well suited to describe the thematic aims of 
environmental law. Gardening as erasing the existing environment to create 
something entirely new is probably just as unrealistic and dangerous an approach as 
resisting environmental change up to the very point of futility. Environmental law 
has always comprised compromises. All of the strict prohibitions in the Wilderness 
Act, the Endangered Species Act, and the Clean Water Act may be waived by permits 
or exemptions.199 Environmental law can accommodate pragmatic adjustments to 
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mitigate extreme disruptions without promising absolute resistance to change. But, 
how does resilience relate to the design principles for law reform itself? 
IV. SHOULD ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ITSELF BE RESILIENT?  
If the naturalistic fallacy is a danger in adopting an observed attribute of natural 
systems as an environmental objective, it is an even greater hazard when we turn to 
the question of legal design.200 Earlier flirtations with applying natural science theory 
to law in the form of eugenics and social Darwinism raise cautionary flags.201 Yet 
much of the non-legal literature on resilience neglects the problem of inflexible law 
completely reliant on uncertain predictions.202 The social-ecological systems 
framework links the institutional concerns of law to the ecological concerns of 
natural resources management. Therefore, it is not possible to consider resilience 
objectives of environmental law without also reforming the adaptive capacity of law 
to promote resilient governance.203 Many areas of statutory law, such as pollution 
control, operate under legislative charters that have scarcely changed in over a 
quarter century.204 Still, federal environmental law already has adaptive qualities. 
This is especially evident in statutes that establish broad goals, standards, and 
procedures for engagement, yet leave specific application to the flexible response of 
states and agencies.205  
Answering whether environmental law itself should be more resilient plunges us 
into the constitutive question of how institutions and procedures are structured.206 In 
other words, how should we decide how to decide? Professor Clark argues that the 
answer is less about the substantive policy choices embedded in legislation or 
regulation.207 Instead, it is more about who participates in making those choices, and 
how. These questions of justice and participation underlie environmental law reform 
challenges.208 Ultimately, environmental law must establish a framework for 
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collective governance. In other words, resilient law should give voice to people in an 
equitable manner. Resilience may sacrifice stability. But, it can deliver better 
distributional results by integrating the social with the ecological in systems analysis 
in environmental law. 
Can a statutory system that is the vintage of the 8-track tape player properly adapt 
to new conditions? Proponents of a resilience framework often answer “no.”209 They 
argue that law itself needs to be resilient in order to promote experimentation and 
change in response. For instance, the Clean Air Act, last significantly amended in 
1990, ignores the harms from greenhouse-gas emissions.210 The EPA attempted to 
bend the Act’s framework to better address the problem of climate change.211 Instead 
of tailoring a rule to the statute, the EPA attempted to tailor a rule to social-ecological 
conditions.212 The Supreme Court stopped the effort.213 The EPA possesses some 
flexibility in implementing the Act, but not enough to adapt the statutory provision 
authorizing stationary source regulation to the mitigation challenge of reducing 
greenhouse-gas emissions.  
Professor Ruhl characterized resilience in legal systems as providing consistency 
“notwithstanding continuous change of external and internal conditions.”214 My 
review of the law journal resilience literature indicates that about three-quarters of 
environmental/natural resources articles (twenty-one of twenty-eight) distinguish the 
role of resilience in setting environmental law objectives from its role in reforming 
law itself.215 Most of the articles also address both issues head-on.216 This should not 
be surprising in the law journals, which—after all—remain centrally engaged with 
legal analysis and reform.  
Just as adaptive management promises to learn while doing and to reduce 
uncertainty through experimentation in achieving environmental goals,217 adaptive 
governance approaches law as a contingent experiment subject to iterative fine-
tuning.218 A more resilient environmental law would be designed not as a fail-safe, 
static utopia. Instead, the emergent resilience property of social-ecological systems 
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demands a “safe-fail” approach that recognizes constant upheaval and adjustment.219 
Unlike systems resistant to change, safe-fail environmental law would encourage 
openness and experimentation in social institutions. Resilient law would mirror the 
bottom-up approach to managing the commons so closely associated with the 
Ostroms’ Bloomington School.220 We do need core principles and long-term 
planning, but with many iterative opportunities along the way to adjust to new 
conditions, better understandings, and changed social values.221 Resilient law would 
provide avenues for citizens to express preferences and influence decisions. Much of 
that is squarely the province of procedural environmental law. Environmental law 
procedure can embrace resilience through mechanisms that generate knowledge and 
promote adaptive responses. Much can be done through administrative decisions, but 
the profound shift from stability to resilience will ultimately require statutory reform.  
If Ambassador Bryce was correct that the national park system is “America’s best 
idea,”222 then NEPA’s environmental impact analysis is America’s most copied 
environmental law idea.223 Both have their roots in the transcendental philosophy 
popularized by Emerson, Thoreau, and Muir, patriarchs of the environmental 
movement.224 Thoreau, in particular, called for a morality of living “deliberately.”225 
Fen Montaigne has characterized this as a system of “weighing the moral 
consequences of one’s actions.”226 Resilience contributes a new framework for 
weighing these consequences. It informs rather than replaces the fundamental, 
jurisprudential core of environmental law: considering consequences. Environmental 
law frequently insists on consideration of impacts that may be far removed in place 
or time from their causes.227 The legislative basis for environmental law is largely a 
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response to the literal “shortcomings” of common-law adjudication to canvass the 
indirect, synergistic, and remote effects of actions.228 Legislation provided 
administrative institutions and procedures for scientific expertise to forecast effects 
beyond the scope of proximate cause. Environmental law promotes justice by 
relating a cold, calculating decision about energy efficiency in clothes driers to the 
effects of coal mining on people many hundreds of miles away who shoulder the loss 
of ecological services and other environmental harms many years into the future. The 
environmental justice movement is not so much a separate subfield of environmental 
law but a clear demand that environmental law live up to its ambitions of weighing 
moral consequences. The importance of environmental justice, which concerns the 
inequities in the distribution of environmental amenities and injuries, is to remind us 
of the core moral principle of law and extend it with deeper understanding.229  
A resilient environmental law that includes the option of adaptive transformation 
of social-ecological systems requires changes to governance.230 This means inviting 
new voices to the table. Environmental law, long confined to its own, specialized 
corridors of power, will be stretched thin to accommodate governance changes. 
Natural resources agencies, in particular, are generally comfortable with 
manipulating the ecological side of the social-ecological system. They are less 
willing to address the social dimensions because these elements are outside of their 
expertise and because their political power generally does not extend that far.231 
Therefore, resilient environmental law will need to be more attentive to social 
transformations. Very little legal analysis examines this aspect of resilient law and 
better consideration of social change must be a priority for future research. It holds 
promise to substantially increase the constituency of Americans who recognize how 
they benefit from environmental law. 
Consideration of the full range of consequences is not merely a technocratic 
balancing of discounted and monetized costs versus benefits. It is a moral calculus 
as well. Parks are good not just because they create tourist revenue or improve public 
health. They are also good because they shape the moral character of generation after 
generation of people exposed to them. Professor Sagoff observed that, if we leave to 
future generations  
an environment that is fit for pigs, they will be like pigs; their tastes will 
adapt to their conditions as ours might when we move from the country 
into town. Suppose we destroyed all of our literary, artistic, and musical 
heritage . . . . We would then ensure a race of uncultured near illiterates. 
Now, suppose we leave an environment dominated by dumps, strip 
mines, and highways. Again, we will ensure that future individuals will 
be illiterate, although in another way. Surely, we should strive to make 
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the human race better . . . . Surely, it is morally bad for us to deteriorate 
into a pack of yahoos who have lost both knowledge of and taste for the 
things that give value and meaning to life. Future generations might not 
complain: A pack of yahoos will like a junkyard environment. This is the 
problem. That kind of future is efficient. It may well be equitable. But it 
is tragic all the same. Our obligation to provide future individuals with 
an environment consistent with ideals we know to be good is an 
obligation not necessarily to those individuals but to the ideals 
themselves.232 
Sagoff reminds us that moral consequences are not pure calculations but expression 
of our aspirations as a body politic. Former U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Director 
Mollie Beattie summarized this view: “[w]hat a country chooses to save is what a 
country chooses to say about itself.”233 Shaping the world requires considerations of 
distributional justice to current generations and aspirations for the future. Kathryn 
Schulz claimed residents of the Pacific Northwest have not fully grappled with the 
potential for a catastrophic earthquake. She explained that the relative brevity of our 
lives breeds “temporal parochialism.”234 We have probably all heard about the 
NIMBY (“not in my back yard”) who opposes certain environmental harms in his 
own neighborhood but raises no objections to similar developments elsewhere. As 
common is the NIMGY (“not in my generation’s years”) who resists difficult 
adjustments now (such as reducing greenhouse-gas emissions) but raises no 
objections to the harms that are then deferred to subsequent generations. One might 
characterize much of the Trump Administration’s energy policies as temporally 
parochial in their reluctance to pay the price today for grave future injuries. The 
latency built into greenhouse-gas pollution raises particularly thorny moral issues.235 
The emissions of the past hundred years have largely locked future generations into 
a much longer period of hotter temperatures, more frequent deluges, longer droughts, 
higher sea levels, and more acidic waters.236 Environmental law must grapple with 
whether that is the future we want for our progeny. 
Another design principle suggested by resilience is related to polycentrism237: the 
ability of law to look across jurisdictional boundaries when necessary to follow 
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consequences and ecological effects. The misfit between boundaries of nature 
reserves and the SES themselves is frequently cited in environmental law 
scholarship.238 Case studies of how managers overcome boundary limitations 
contribute to our toolbox of strategies,239 but law could do a better job incorporating 
greater flexibility. For instance, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service started facilitating 
landscape conservation designs, which are collaborative efforts to better coordinate 
what multiple but differently focused conservation stakeholders wish to accomplish 
on lands and in programs they control.240 The Lower Wabash watershed in Illinois 
and Indiana has experienced dramatic habitat loss and nutrient pollution over the past 
century.241 Its landscape conservation design could be a proving ground for 
reconstituting the on-the-ground “law of the land” in a manner less constrained by 
ownership and jurisdictional boundaries. But that will require sustained engagement 
by the federal government, which may yet revoke its support for this aspect of 
resilience in legal action. 
 Resilience can contribute to structural environmental law reform. In addition to 
the technocratic alterations necessary to promote adaptive management,242 resilience 
should attend to the endogenous moral decisions about public actions or regulation. 
But it is not an end in and of itself. Instead, resilience is a catalyst for achieving the 
often implicit moral goals of environmental law.  
CONCLUSION 
Scholars will always debate how to best conceptualize environmental law. Every 
generation will consider new ways to understand the world and discard older 
frameworks that no longer map onto our aspirations or observations. Without the 
benefit of hindsight, it is difficult to predict whether resilience will endure as 
environmental law’s framework for mediating between governance and a changing 
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world. Environmental law scholarship on resilience over the past decade has 
delivered important theoretical insights and extracted practical lessons from case 
studies. This Article is an attempt to distill that work and apply it to the fundamental 
questions of environmental law. Resilience and social-ecological systems 
frameworks have already exerted some influence over environmental law. Resilience 
modifies rather than replaces environmental law’s core principle of precaution 
through process. Resilience is a property of our world. Nonetheless, it may serve as 
a management aim for systems performing in an optimal fashion. Resilience delivers 
better understanding of how caution operates in complex systems and provides 
procedural tools. It allows for adaptation through experience and relieves governance 
of the impossible task of ensuring all predictions are accurate before embarking on 
management or regulation. But the more radical challenges of resilience to 
environmental law are twofold. 
First, resilience turns away from the futile search for certainty or finality in 
systems essentially characterized by high variability and low predictability. 
Environmental law often serves as our “law of the land” that translates ideas into on-
the-ground practices. That translational function requires more candor and 
experimentation in all environmental decisions. Adaptive management requires 
softening our commitment to final agency actions and res judicata. Therefore, 
adaptive management poses tremendous challenges for the enforceable substantive 
standards so closely associated with the 1970s-era magisterial environmental statutes 
and judicial interpretations of administrative safeguards. Crude rules of thumb, such 
as bans on discharges without permits or prohibitions on jeopardizing endangered 
species, must continue to play some role because our knowledge will always fall 
short of understanding the full repercussions of actions in complex adaptive systems. 
Burdens of proof in common law and administrative settings need root-to-branch 
reassessment in light of the resilience framework. Conservation is restraint and thus 
conservative. But it is not sustainability and should not foreclose transformation. 
Resilient environmental law helps identify circumstances where stability is infeasible 
or undesirable. 
Second, resilience as a management goal offers a framework for confronting the 
social drivers of unjust and inadequate outcomes of decades of environmental 
management that excluded some people. To live deliberately requires we 
contemplate distributive impacts as moral consequences. Environmental law must 
blaze paths for social change. Power structures must yield to fairer ways of 
provisioning social systems. During World War II, C.S. Lewis wrote that “[m]an’s 
power over Nature turns out to be a power exercised by some men over other men 
with Nature as its instrument.”243 Only the environmental justice strand of 
environmental law has forthrightly dealt with this longstanding reality. With the echo 
of Elinor Ostrom whispering in our ears,244 the legal response to environmental crises 
must address the social dimension to environmental management, and it must be 
experimental both spatially and temporally. 
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